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Abstract
Singapore in the 1950s was a deeply divided society. Struggling to recover from the hardships of
the Second World War and fighting an internal battle that the British government termed an
‘emergency’, it was a time of hardship, tension, and anxiety. In the midst of this crisis, Singapore’s
inhabitants continued to manage the natural elements of their climate and environment, especially
the dangerous combination of heavy monsoonal rains, low-lying marshland, and tidal flooding.
This article examines the circumstances surrounding a particularly severe episode of flooding that
occurred in December 1954. It explores how the flood’s impact was exacerbated by human
exigencies, especially recent government resettlement plans and infrastructural weaknesses.
In line with the themes of this special issue, it explores the notion of ‘justice’ during a disaster.
In this case, justice was intimately related to political agency, social vulnerability and resilience.
Viewed in this way, the flood story can be used as a lens into the wider socio-political contexts of
the time.
Keywords
Climate change, environmental change, environmental governance, environmental justice, flood
risk management
Introduction
Post-war Singapore and the climate: Putting the floods into context
Post-war Singapore was an uneasy place in which to live. It was still recovering from the
mental and physical injuries of the Second World War; economic insecurity, rationing,
poverty, and malnutrition were facts of everyday life. The returning British government
faced a new battle: to rebuild and to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of an increasingly divided
society (Ng, 2012; Ramakrishna, 2002). Tensions between the government and the majority
Chinese population of the city were especially tense. Labour unrest, trade unionism, and
strikes were increasingly common. The establishment of the Malayan Communist Party
(MCP) in 1946 threatened British authority and the party’s aggressive tactics led the
government to declare a state of emergency in 1948 (Cheah, 2003). The ‘Emergency’
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would last 12 years. The mid-1950s were critical years in many respects. By then, MCP
tactics were shifting away from violent methods towards inﬁltrating legal political
organisations and inﬂuencing from within. The Rendel Constitution of 1954
(commissioned in 1953) had expanded Malayan political representation, a ﬁrst step
towards internal self-government, albeit under British control (Constitutional
Commission, 1954). The ﬁrst elections under this new arrangement were held in the spring
of 1955, which saw a contest between several new parties including the People’s Action Party
(PAP) – established November 1954 – and the Labour Front under David Marshall (Chan,
2008). It was in this politically charged context that one of the worst episodes of ﬂooding in
20th century Singapore took place.
Singapore has two annual monsoon periods, the most severe occurring during November
to January known as the northeast monsoon bringing heavy rains, storms, and ﬂash-
ﬂooding. The city is a low-lying coastal port, with three major rivers (Singapore, Rochor,
and Kallang), built across what were once large swathes of marsh and swampland. Tidal
ﬂooding, riverine ﬂooding, and monsoonal ﬂooding were therefore common hazards. Whilst
every year saw ﬂoods, at least once in every decade or so across Singapore’s history from
1819 to 1954, there occurred a particularly severe event that went down in popular memory
as a ‘Great Flood’. Often, these were occasions when exceptionally heavy rains (often,
though not always, related to La Nin˜a) and high tides combined. The years 1884, 1892,
1909, 1911, 1925, 1934 are good examples. However, the scale of ﬂooding could not always
be solely attributed to extreme weather. December 1954 was once such occasion.
Although there is evidence for La Nin˜a in the 1954–55 season, it is generally considered a
weak event (Gergis and Fowler, 2009).1 There were exceptionally heavy rains in Singapore
over the northeast monsoon season nonetheless, some combining with high tides, which
created a series of ﬂood events that aﬀected the city and its surrounding hinterlands
during December. Some of the worst aﬀected areas were coastal and low lying but at
least 10,000 inhabitants across Singapore were aﬀected to some degree. Five thousand
people became temporary refugees, many losing their homes and livelihood in the process.
Five people died – a family – during an abortive rescue operation. Whilst some might contest
how far this was a ‘disaster’ this article works from the premise that, as Gerrit J. Schenck has
recently pointed out, a nature-induced disaster is considered such ‘if it is perceived as such in
human culture i.e. by harming people . . .’ (Schenck, 2017). For those people who lost
everything in 1954 as we shall see, the ﬂoods were indeed a disaster.
History as a tool in understanding the bigger picture
The factors that led to such severe disruption in some areas of Singapore in 1954 will be
explored at length during the article. Suﬃce to say here that it was human and structural
factors that had made a bad situation disastrous. As Greg Bankoﬀ (2017), Uwe Lu¨bken and
Christof Mauch (2011), and many others have argued, the impact of a disaster is generally
uneven, disproportionately aﬀecting society’s most vulnerable. Thus, the magnitude of a
disaster is intimately linked to social vulnerability, risk, and resilience (Blaikie et al., 1994;
Bulkeley, 2001; Douglass, 2016; Smith, 1996). Singapore, like many other colonial port
cities, had a high number of low-income residents, often recent migrants with limited
support networks, who lived in cheaper areas in substandard housing. In Singapore, land
was cheap where it was low lying, swampy, and ﬂood-prone. Lacking many basic
infrastructural necessities (good drainage/ﬂood mitigation schemes) to manage the impact
of tropical weather, the people who lived in these areas were at the greatest risk from, and
the least resilient to, extreme weather (Lai and Tan, 2015; Rahman et al., 2016).
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However, although socio-economic circumstances are important, a community’s level of
political agency and social marginalisation can also be a signiﬁcant contributing factor to
their vulnerability (Ngai, 2015). As Janku et al. (2012) highlighted, the political context of a
disaster is critical to the outcome. Politics creates the localised framework for cultural and
social resilience and is often at the root of a disaster’s cause and impact. The concept of
‘disaster justice’ – the framework that links the essays in this special issue – thus becomes
a useful lens by which to explore the political context of the events of December 1954.
The term itself – coined by Robert Verchick in 2012 – may be recent but its
encompassing philosophy is not. Justice in disaster situations is intimately connected with
the social inequalities that are created in political spaces (including vulnerability, risk, and
resilience at their very core) and people’s agency to successfully manage a disaster situation
(Verchick, 2012). When government or people fail in this task, it signals a failure in some
combination of policy, management, and infrastructure (both physical and social). Disaster
justice (or injustice) is only possible within a political space. In this article, which draws from
historical methodology and disaster history, disaster justice will be conceptualised in two
main ways. The ﬁrst relates to political justice, that is the right to determine culpability for
the disaster and is related to the matter of popular political agency. The second, and
associated, form of disaster justice connects with the legal context, particularly the
avoidance of responsibility by government by terming the disaster an ‘Act of God’.
Taking as a central premise the claim that all disasters occur in political space, this paper
will explore the situation of marginalised Singaporean communities during and after the
major ﬂoods of December 1954. It tells the story of the ﬂoods; explores the British
government’s short-, medium-, and long-term plans to deal with ﬂooding and examines
the immediate political consequences. In all instances, attention should be paid to the
diﬀerent temporal scales of prevention and recovery, from short-term coping strategies
such as sandbagging and ﬁnancial handouts to longer term post-disaster recovery and
rebuilding and future mitigation plans. Whilst the British government responded quickly
and eﬀectively to the disaster with charitable aid and a coordinated clean-up operation,
many Singaporeans believed that it was the government’s policy and actions over the
preceding months that had exacerbated the scale of ﬂooding in some areas, the rural
Bedok community of southeast Singapore in particular. Central to the narrative of
complaint was the government’s forcible resettlement policy, moving people from
established communities to new, ill-prepared sites with poor infrastructural facilities.
Despite pressure from inhabitants and opposition parties to accept their culpability,
government propaganda during and immediately after the event, and their control over
the main press outlets, enabled them to manage the political message and evade
immediate responsibility for the crisis. The ﬂoods were framed as force majeure,
unforeseeable and extraordinary events for which nobody – especially government – could
be held accountable. The aﬀected inhabitants believed that justice had not been served in this
instance, a view that was revealed most forcefully at the ballot box the following spring.
Keeping ‘justice’ at the forefront of the discussion then, this article will examine the
reasons why the rural Bedok community were so vulnerable and the government’s
attitude towards the inhabitants’ ongoing complaints. It will also argue that the
contemporary sense of disaster justice – or, in this case, injustice – contributed towards
the outcome of the next year’s elections. In so doing, it explores the disaster as a window
into the wider historical socio-political context of the period and shows how such events
were appropriated for political means.
The article uses a range of primary sources, mainly gleaned from the National Archives of
Singapore and the National Library of Singapore. Sources range from newspaper reports,
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governmental press statements, letters, and communications from resident’s committees,
maps, opposition government statements, oral histories, radio broadcasts, and
photographs. Governmental sources are well represented due to the survival of records
about the event. It must also be remembered that the press was under tight control due to
the ongoing state of emergency, called in response to the perceived communist threat by the
MCP. It must also be noted that it was the Chinese who were suspected of following the
communist cause and it was Chinese rural and squatter communities who were worst
aﬀected by the ﬂoods. This adds an additional dimension to the case study that should
not be overlooked and strongly suggests that what we read in the press should be viewed
with caution. Indeed, the large ﬁle of press statements released by the government
propaganda department about the ﬂoods and the lack of press criticism is, in itself, telling.
The floods
1954 was an exceptionally wet year. The wettest in fact since 1934 and 1925, the only years in
the early 20th century to compare.2 There had been a ‘violent rainstorm’ in October 1954,
with a heavy rainfall on the night of 22nd, causing ﬂoods on the 23rd (The Straits Times,
October 1954: 1). Then again, in December heavy rains began to fall overnight on
Wednesday 8 December and continued to fall almost unceasingly for two days. By ﬁrst
light on Thursday morning, the police had alerted the Social Welfare Department (SWD)
to serious ﬂooding in many of the low-lying areas of the island. The SWD were responsible
for coordinating disaster recovery operations and, given the high incidence of ﬂooding on
the island, their ﬁrst response was to send teams to known ﬂood-prone areas to assess the
damage. They highlighted Bedok, Potong Pasir, Geylang Serai, Lorong Tai Seng, and the
Balestier and Braddell Roads as potential danger zones (Cromwell, 1954: 1). The SWD’s
disaster response began almost immediately. By 10:45 am, departmental oﬃcers were at each
site ready to give assistance and to begin the process of converting schools, churches, and
other public buildings into emergency relief centres. These 24 hour centres were staﬀed in the
main by volunteers and members of voluntary organisations including the Salvation Army,
Red Cross, Blue Cross, and St John Ambulance.
Between 7:30am on the 9th and 7:30 am on the 10th, 8.69 inches of rain fell on Singapore, a
record for one day (The Straits Times, 1954: 1). As was generally the case in Singapore’s
historic ﬂoods, the exceptional rain was not the sole cause of the inundation; its combination
with a very high tide was a key factor. The rain abated at 4 pm on the 10th – 42 hours after it
had started – but a further half an inch fell on the night of the 10th (The Straits Times, 1954:
1). Floodwaters reached four feet in depth in areas including Geylang Serai, Potong Pasir,
Bedok, Bukit Timah, and the Kallang and Whampoa River areas. By the second night,
operations were stepped up in order to accommodate the large numbers of people who
found themselves homeless. The military provided vehicles suited to deep water to transport
beds, blankets, and other supplies to the relief centres to help cope with the growing numbers
of displaced inhabitants. The SWD established a ﬂood emergency HQ at the Civil Defence
Headquarters at Kolam Ayer. On the Friday, more than 3000 hot meals were served at the
various relief centres, along with coﬀee, biscuits, and milk. Relief payments were given out to
people in need, a sum totalling $27,240 over two days to 493 families (Radio Malaya, 1954).
When the waters began to ebb on the 11th, people began to return home. Transport
services suspended on the Thursday quickly returned to normal. A ﬂight carrying
American actress Ava Gardner, who had been stuck in Penang on her way to Singapore,
arrived and she ‘was able to resume her planned promotional tour from Raﬄes Hotel for the
premier of her new ﬁlm ‘‘The Barefoot Contessa’’’ (The Straits Times, 1954: 1; Sturgis, 2015).
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A ‘hard core of homeless’ remained at the centres, however, with Bedok and Potong Pasir
inhabitants some of the worst aﬀected. At Bedok, 100 people stayed on, and at Potong Pasir
some 300 were forced to spend the night at St Andrew’s School (Cromwell, 1954: 2).
On 12 December, however, disaster struck once more. After only two days’ respite, the
rains began again in earnest. In the 24 hours between 7pm on the 12th to 7 pm on the 13th,
1.40 inches of rain fell. Rescue squads were on alert for possible evacuations as water lapped
into the doorways of homes in Bedok and Potong Pasir (The Straits Times, 1954: 1). As before,
the response was immediate and involved various governmental, military, and non-
governmental bodies. The SWD, Civil Defence Department, Royal Malayan Navy and
Army, military reserve forces, Royal Air Force, Salvation Army, St John Ambulance
Brigade, Red Cross, the Rural Board, the police, and an army of volunteers were all called up.
Schools were yet again transformed into relief centres where food, money, and other items
were given out and beds provided for the homeless. The Yock Eng School catered for
Malays of the Geylang Serai area and at Potong Pasir, St Andrew’s School was a major
distribution point and shelter (Public Relations Singapore, 1954c). These centres relied
heavily on the eﬀorts of the staﬀ and students themselves, many of whom appeared fairly
expert in handling this type of situation. Richard Tonne, a student at St Andrew’s School,
was interviewed by Radio Malaya. He said that before the ﬂoods, the school had been
involved in helping the poorer members of that community: ‘they had survey teams going
out and a clinic run by the boys in the village, so when the ﬂoods came they knew the area
well’. Lee Teck Ping, a junior teacher, told how ‘they had four hundred people living in their
school hall from villages oﬀ Potong Pasir. We had sent people out to collect them in boats’.
Referring to the numbers of people still homeless from the ﬂooding on the 8–10th, he added
that although ‘the St John’s Ambulance look after the sick. . . many have been living in
ﬂooded conditions for some time’ (Radio Malaya, 1954). The incidence of diseases related to
the wet conditions, especially malaria and colds, was steadily increasing, and many had lost
everything they owned. The relief eﬀorts and donations were simply not enough; they were
still in urgent need of clothes and money.
The ﬂoods continued into the next week. Heavy rains falling on the 16th contributed to the
mire and raised concerns that further evacuations might be needed. Plans were put in place to
reopen St Andrew’s and Bedok Boy’s School, and the Salvation Army Kindergarten at
Towner Road which had only recently closed (Public Relations Singapore, 1954e). By the
17th, 500 refugees were back at Bedok Boy’s School, 800 at St Andrew’s, 100 at Braddell Road
School, and 100 at the Salvation Army Kindergarten (Public Relations Singapore, 1954f).
In the short to medium term, the government put in place plans for rehabilitation,
speciﬁcally aimed at the farming communities of Bedok, Potong Pasir, Geylang Serai, and
Lorong Tai Seng. This plan relied on the ﬁndings of dedicated survey teams who were sent
into the ﬁeld to identify the needs of individuals and families in those areas. Twelve ﬁve-man
investigative teams were put together by the SWD at their emergency HQ at Kolam Ayer.
They included oﬃcers from rural, medical, and SWDs, amongst others (Public Relations
Singapore, 1954g). A leaﬂet was drafted for distribution at the worst-aﬀected areas entitled
‘Government Comes to Assist You’. It described the planned Government Rehabilitation
Survey scheme, explaining how oﬃcers would be calling on them to assess losses. It also
explained that oﬃcer’s report would be the only oﬃcial document accepted by the
government in determining how much assistance would be necessary (Public Relations
Oﬃce to Colonial Secretary, 1954). Interim measures, such as the distribution of free rice,
continued throughout the month (Public Relations Singapore, 1954h).
Monies for immediate relief and rehabilitation were raised through a combination of
public and private funding. The scale of the disaster was such that it inspired an
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overwhelming outpouring of generosity from the wider Singapore community. Local traders,
small business owners, and the general public made generous donations of rice, tinned milk,
clothes, and money. As early as 10 December, for example six local businesses gave bags of
rice, cases of sardines, and salt ﬁsh towards the relief eﬀort (Public Relations Singapore,
1954c). The largest coordinated fund was established by the Straits Times, which raised the
amazing sum of $278,000 by the end of the month. The single largest donation was from the
government ($50,000) but others contributed what they could. Two young boys aged nine
and 10, for example, on hearing of the terrible plight of the victims, went around their estate
collecting money. They raised the grand sum of $102.49, which they presented to the Straits
Times, along with a bundle of clothes (The Straits Times, 1954: 9). The Nanyang Siang Pau
newspaper and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce also raised large sums, and collected
gifts, including biscuits and medicines (Singapore Government, 1955; The Straits Times,
1954: 9). The British government spent an additional $381,000 by the end of the year on
the relief eﬀort, some of which paid for seeds, fertilisers, and livestock for the devastated
farmers. Rice was also donated by the Governments of Burma and Thailand (Singapore
Government, 1955).
The situation at Bedok
One of the worst-aﬀected areas in 1954 was Bedok (Singapore and Johore Bahru, Flood Map,
1954; Figure 1). In the early 1950s Bedok was a largely rural area with two small coastal,
ﬁshing communities and some small villages. Bedok’s population expanded exponentially in
1953, when farmers then living in Paya Lebar were moved to Bedok by the government to free
up land required for a new airﬁeld (which oﬃcially opened on 20 August 1955). During the
ﬁrst round of resettlement, 561 houses were demolished, 4414 people were moved, and 296
families were resettled. However, more families than originally anticipated were required to be
moved from out of danger zones. The result was the removal of an additional 838 people to
Bedok and the demolition of another 118 houses over the course of the mid-1950s. The
resettlement camp comprised of 392 plots (either shop or house plots) with small farm plots
of two to three acres each. A transit camp was also established for those people who could not
aﬀord to immediately build their own accommodation at the new site.
The new site came with its own set of problems, of which the government was fully aware.
In the rush to complete the airﬁeld, residents were moved before the Bedok site was ready.
Commissioner J. E. Pepper warned during 1953 that basic amenities including water
standpipes and roads were still being built (The Singapore Free Press, 1954: 5). The low-
lying area was also notorious for ﬂooding. This fact had been noted by the villagers even
before the move, some of the more vocal protesting ‘against the unsuitability of Bedok’ as a
resettlement site, pointing out ‘that the area would ﬂood easily’ (Bedok Flood Committee,
1954; Figure 2). The new community’s main defence was a bund wall which, although useful
during heavy rain, was not substantial enough to withstand the scale of the exceptional
weather of December 1954. As early as 10 December, the bund had threatened to break.
A 100 men responded by rallying to prevent ﬂoodwaters from overﬂowing into Bedok
village, shoring up the bund wall with 4000 sandbags provided by the PWD (Goode,
1954: 1; The Straits Times, 1954: 1). Despite their hard work, the unceasing rains
breached the wall on the 12th.
In Bedok, as elsewhere, the local authorities had been quick to react. A press release
issued on the 9th reveals that teams from the SWD, PWD, Civil Defence, and the police had
been on the scene within a few hours of the rains starting. The SWD provided hot meals for
the victims from the very ﬁrst day, distributing 500 meals at lunch and the same again in the
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evening. The Public Relations Singapore (1954b) was also at the site, making loudspeaker
announcements informing people where to obtain food and medical aid. On the 10th, 1500
meals were served at the Bedok Boy’s School and the Sin Hwa school. The Bedok Boy’s
School was quickly utilised as a temporary shelter for the women and children, the army and
the Medical Department providing 150 beds (Public Relations Singapore, 1954c; The Straits
Figure 1. Survey showing Siglap, Ulu Bedok and Bedok, 1953. Source: National Archives of Singapore Map
Collection. Provisional Issue (Siglap, Ulu Bedok, Bedok) Sheet 9, First Edition, Survey Department,
Federation of Malaya No. 16-1953. Courtesy of Singapore Land Authority.
Figure 2. Map of south-east Singapore, showing Paya Lebar, the new airfield development site and pre-
resettlement Bedok, 1945. Source: National University of Singapore, ARCGIS Singapore Historical Maps,
1945. Courtesy of the Department of Geography, National University of Singapore and SAF Mapping Unit.
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Times, 1954: 1). Relief monies of $10 per person were given out to all residents in the Bedok
area by the SWD as a baseline. On the 10th alone $9320 was given out to 171 families at
Bedok to help with immediate needs (Public Relations Singapore, 1954d). The Under
Secretary J. D. Higham, who had been on site that morning to view the ﬂooded area,
praised the eﬃciency of the response teams and volunteers (Public Relations Singapore,
1954c). On the 12th, a further $2540 was given out to 74 families, many of whom had not
been able to return home in the aftermath of the ﬁrst ﬂood.
Early on the morning of the 12th, a survey team was dispatched to begin work on
assessing damages and the ‘needs of the people of the Bedok area’ (Public Relations
Singapore, 1954d). The team comprised representatives of the Rural Board, Agricultural
and Veterinary Oﬃces, SWD, PWD, and the Rural Health Oﬃce. The team was to build on
the eﬀorts of the PWD Engineer who had been posted to the Bedok site since 23 October,
when the area had last ﬂooded. A scheme had been underway to widen and straighten the
Bedok River and to raise the bunds by more than two and a half feet between Changi Road
and the outlet to the sea. This scheme was virtually complete by the time of the December
rains but, clearly, it was insuﬃcient.
Speaking on the 14th of December, Colonial Secretary William Goode stated that,
although at that moment in time it was impossible to estimate the extent of damage to
property, at least 250 acres of Bedok had been submerged, as compared to 150 in
October. The tremendous loss of livestock to this predominantly farming community was
also a serious consideration (Goode, 1954). It was estimated that the Bedok farmers had lost
crops and poultry to the value of $750,000 (The Straits Times, 1954: 1). If we recall that this
was the second ﬂood that they had suﬀered in only a few months, then the combined losses
must have been devastating. The inhabitants responded by forming a special committee,
headed by chief members of that community as spokespersons. In communities like Bedok,
local committees or associations were not uncommon. Many Chinese belonged to some form
of association based on locality, name, or kinship. These associations were a traditional
means of support and oﬀered a sense of belonging. In 1950s Singapore, many of these
associations became politicised and/or involved with the trade union movement. The
Bedok Flood Committee was an example of a group that formed spontaneously in
response to speciﬁc non-political circumstances, yet their voice reﬂected some of the
grievances that were proving contentious at that time. These included poor living
standards and working conditions, a rising cost of living, and the seeming indiﬀerence of
the government. A large part of the blame for the devastation of their village, they argued,
was their forcible resettlement to an unsuitable site, despite repeated warning by residents
and government oﬃcials. The Committee threatened that if the government did not heed
their cry for help, they would return to Paya Lebar. The angry farmers also made demands
for recompense, arguing that they had been moved against their will and before the site was
ready. ‘Many of us are now in debt’, the committee claimed in January 1955 and
many of us cannot hope to get back, at any time in the foreseeable future, to the ﬁnancial
position we were in at Paya Lebar. . . is it too much to expect compensation for such loss out
of the public funds? (The Straits Times, 1954: 1)
The official response
The City Council, clearly under pressure, issued a formal statement on 11 December. This
sought to deﬂect the focus away from Bedok. Drainage, the statement noted, was an ongoing
problem but this was the case for the whole island. Bedok was not a special case. Moreover,
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there were extenuating circumstances. The rainfall had been extraordinary, a fact backed up
by the Malayan Meteorological Department (The Straits Times, 1954: 1). Local sawmill
owners should also shoulder some blame, argued the government, as the rivers had
become bloated at high tide from logs had clogging the Kallang and Whampoa Rivers
(The Straits Times, 1954: 4). The statement went on to argue that the government had
not been complacent. Referencing how since October, a full-time engineer had been
working on developing a ﬂood mitigation scheme for the Bedok area, it revealed that His
Excellency the Governor (W. A. C. Goode) had personally assured government that this
scheme would be accelerated, regardless of the cost. Goode had also authorised the
appointment of an additional drainage engineer to work on a plan for the immediate
‘drainage of the whole of Singapore Island’. This plan would incorporate ﬂood control
and prevention (Public Relations Singapore, 1954d). Three days later, Goode issued his
own public statement, saying that ‘in view of the very fact that the people in the Bedok
area were resettled at the instance of the Government, immediate relief payments of $10 per
head. . . had been made. These payments total nearly $30,000’ (Goode, 1954: 2). He added
that the Government was considering how best to meet the needs of those who had lost
livestock in the disaster, so that farming could be resumed as soon as possible.
A more personal response to Bedok was sent from J. D. Higham, Under Secretary in the
Colonial Secretary’s Oﬃce, to Tan Keng Huan, Chairman of the Bedok Flood Relief
Committee on 22 December. Higham oﬀered his assurances that government would do its
upmost to help Bedok residents ‘to start anew and prevent a recurrence of ﬂood disasters’.
Nevertheless, Higham refused to admit governmental responsibility for the underpreparation
of the new Bedok site. He iterated that the government had, in fact, spent $120,000 on drains,
bunds, and a sea gate. The problem in 1954, he argued, was the ‘exceptional’ weather, not the
government’s hydraulic management strategy. He went on to say that of course, given the
circumstances, work was now under way to ‘strengthen and raise the bund and. . . to cut a
straight channel through to the sea for the Bedok River, so that surplus waters may drain
away more rapidly’. Higham also made a point of highlighting that, whilst the government
intended to do its utmost to help the ﬂood victims and rehabilitate those persons whose
livelihoods had been ‘temporarily interrupted’, the principle of compensation ‘cannot be
accepted’. He ended his missive on a high note, praising inhabitants’ spirit in the face of
disaster and, by expressing his conﬁdence that ‘the people of Bedok will show that they are
determined to conquer adversity’ (Higham, 1954a).
Higham’s letter is an excellent example of government propaganda. The deliberate and
careful use of linguistic devices presented a certain range of public ‘facts’. Morally and
politically obliged to render assistance, the government had to ensure that monies,
material items, or assistance were given as ‘aid’ or as ‘rehabilitation’. This cast the
government in the role of benefactor: altruistic and benevolent. Whilst compensation may
have amounted to the same ﬁnancial or material disbursements, the refusal to use the term
‘compensation’ fundamentally shifted blame from the government. The ﬂood was an ‘Act of
God’, unpreventable despite the best-laid plans. The government had, in Higham’s words,
provided appropriate hydraulic works and could not be held responsible for the exceptional
weather. A separate but revealing comment by Secretary for Social Welfare Thomas
Cromwell divulged that the farmers should be helped because ‘we need the food they
produce’ and ‘that there was no question of paying them compensation. The accent
was on rehabilitation of all genuine farmer victims’ (The Singapore Free Press, 1954: 1).
By framing aid as ‘rehabilitation’, the government again sidestepped any accountability
for the disaster. Giving ‘compensation’ would have been akin to an admittance of guilt.
To enhance the impact of Higham’s letter to the Bedok farmers, it was not kept private but
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issued as a press statement on the 23rd. The strategy was clear: to manage criticism though
an illusion of public transparency. The ﬁnal sentences of Higham’s letter, praising the Bedok
settlers for their courage in the face of adversity, cemented the tactic. Acknowledging their
travails and determination, Higham’s (1954a) word cast the settlers as a self-suﬃcient
community whose industry (not reliance on others) would see them through.
Subsequent press statements followed the same line. The day after Higham’s letter went
public, his oﬃce released a formal statement on the Bedok Resettlement Rehabilitation
Scheme. The statement emphasised the expediency of mitigation works already
undertaken, in addition to expounding on the amount of money the government was
investing. A sum of $50,000 had already been expended on public works alone, with
another $300,000 earmarked for immediate to midterm solutions. This was in spite of the
full plan being as yet unrealised: more would be spent in future (Higham, 1954b).
The same strategy of releasing rehabilitation expenditures was followed for Potong Pasir
and Geylang Serai, although – perhaps because of more minor criticism in respect to
government policy in these areas – press coverage was not as high proﬁle. The
government Public Relations Department also worked hard with the press to highlight
human interest stories, rather than stories of tragedy or failure. News stories thus told of
individual’s heroism, from ‘the Big-Hearted Heroes of St Andrews [school] who faced danger
without ﬂinching’ to help ﬂood victims, to the pictures of a woman receiving day old chicks
from a relief centre so she ‘can start afresh’, as though this minor gesture would ameliorate
all her troubles (The Straits Times, 1954: 7). Fast and eﬀective governmental assistance was
also stressed. On 15 December, a letter to the government from residents of Geylang Serai
praising the city council and police for the ‘magniﬁcent job done during the recent ﬂoods’
was made public. In particular, the letter noted the ‘eﬀorts made in replacing the bridge that
spanned our road’ within only 24 hours (Public Relations Singapore, 1954a).
A response came from Bedok, penned on 19 January to the Colonial Secretary. Kang Jeo
Hong, Acting Chairman of the Bedok Flood Committee, wrote that a general meeting had
been held in the community to discuss Higham’s letter and an appropriate response. The
letter, though couched in suitably polite (though not deferential) language, revealed the
resident’s unwillingness to capitulate and reiterated many of the same concerns and issues
as before. Their particular bugbear was that they had been made to move to an unsuitable
site in the ﬁrst place, questioning the justice of resettlement ‘against their will at the
Government’s behest to make way for a public project’. They speciﬁcally asked that, if
ﬂooding could not be prevented, that they be moved to a ‘less vulnerable part of the
island’ (Kang, 1955). This was crucial as the problem was not just the scale of the ﬂoods
that December, but the fact that the area well known for frequent coastal ﬂooding.
Regardless of relief and rehabilitation eﬀorts by the government, they argued, the
residents would never be able to establish themselves if their crops, animals, and
livelihoods were wiped out during every rainy season. Moreover, they claimed that the
government’s aid eﬀorts were inadequate and arbitrary, pointing out that ‘families
suﬀering heavy losses have received less relief than those suﬀering lighter losses’. Finally,
they invoked their right to moral and fair treatment. It seems that they had consulted
lawyers as to their legal right to compensation and had been told that they had no case
against the government. Therefore, they appealed instead to the British sense of morality and
paternalistic duty.
The Bedok residents were not entirely on their own however. The press, whilst the oﬃcial
mouthpiece for the government’s press statements and tightly controlled, did not vocalise
only one perspective. Early in December, The Straits Times ran a story of a Bedok family
who had lost everything in the ﬂood. Evacuated by sampan, photographs revealed a woman
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weeping after her crops and her home had been destroyed (The Straits Times, 1954). The
farmer’s situation could not have been illustrated more clearly than in the experiences of Ang
Kin, this 90-year-old inhabitant of Bedok, previously Paya Lebar. On 23 January, more than
a month since the start of the tragedy, her story was printed. It reveals much about the
hardship of resident’s lives post-resettlement. ‘In the past three months’, the reporter
claimed,
Ang Kin has had to be carried out of her house three times to escape rising ﬂoodwaters. She has
been sent twice to the Bedok Boy’s School and once to a shop in Changi where she was looked
after until she was able to return with her granddaughter. Yesterday found Ang Kin once again
at the school. . . asked what she thought of the ﬂoods Ang Kin just smiled sadly and shook her
head without saying a word. (The Straits Times, 1955: 3)
Members of Singapore’s Legislative Council, the local governing body, had also raised
questions concerning the government’s ﬂood policy. A vocal spokesperson was Mr M. P.
D Nair (founder member of the Singapore Labour Party) who had contended at that
December’s Council meeting that the ‘citizens of Singapore are generally concerned over
the eﬀects of ﬂoods in the Colony [and] that they are dissatisﬁed over the slow progress made
by the Authorities concerned in alleviating [them]’ (Goode, 1954: 1). A year later, a damning
report written by Francis Thomas, Minister for Communications and Works in the new
Labour Front government elected in spring 1955, critiqued the previous government’s
schemes. In his opinion, the ﬂooding at Bedok was caused by the fact that ‘the site in
general resembles a large bottle with a very small neck, through which all the ﬂoodwaters
must escape’ and that the
resettlement area with its protective bund eﬀectively blocks more than three-quarters of the path
available for the ﬂoodwaters to run oﬀ to the sea. . . In short, Bedok’s troubles arise from the
mistake of the previous government in horridly moving the Paya Lebar farmers to Bedok
without taking steps to control ﬂooding.
He went further, claiming that ‘all the ﬂoods of Singapore arise from past errors in
development and from lack of planning’. His government inherited these mistakes and
‘a great deal of work and time and money will be needed before these errors can be
corrected’ (Thomas, 1956).
Placing the flood into context
Whilst there is a clear argument against the government for executing the Bedok
resettlement without proper attention to the community’s wishes and needs, this story
is not so simply explained. The 1950s were a time of immense political change for
Singapore. By the end of the Second World War, nationalism in Britain’s Asian
colonies had undergone a transformation. The concept of ‘Empire’ was considered
increasingly anachronistic by British Asians and by many Britons themselves (Bayley
and Harper, 2008: 16, 26). Leftist politics and socialist movements, including the
Labour movement, had gained widespread popular support. Singapore was no
exception. As noted earlier, the government had declared a state of emergency in June
1948, following an armed insurgency by the MCP. It has been argued that 1953–1954 were
critical years in expanding leftist support in Singapore, in large part due to the ‘levels of
economic exploitation and social injustice and the liberalisation that accompanied moves
towards self-government and democracy’ (Chin, 2008: 58). Certainly, the 1950s provided
a combination of circumstances to increase political consciousness amongst the labouring
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classes, including the rise of a strong labour movement, especially in Chinese
communities. The 1950s also witnessed an expansion in Malay political activism,
especially in connection to the call for independence and, after 1951, the use of English
as the primary medium of education in Malay schools (Gillis, 2008: 154).
In February 1954, the report of the Rendel Constitutional Commission (appointed by
Governor John Nicoll in 1953 to investigate and review Singapore’s constitution) was a
signiﬁcant step towards encouraging and enabling greater political participation.
It recommended expansion of the electorate and the formation of a larger 32-member
Legislative Assembly, with 25 seats up for election. This directly encouraged the
formation of new parties, including the PAP and the Labour Front (Ng, 2009). These
were also very active years for the MCP via trade unions and rural residents
associations (Chin, 2008: 3). Recurrent ﬂooding was appropriated as a political weapon
by government opponents as yet one more example of the failures of the extant
administration. The 1954 ﬂoods were used by both the PAP and the Singapore Farmer’s
Association as a means to hit back against the British Government, accusing them of
exacerbating the problems caused by heavy rains by failing to maintain rural drains and
for the Bedok ﬁasco (Loh, 2013).
As Sikko Visscher (2008) is at pains to point out, the story of the 1955 legislative election
has paled in signiﬁcance to the 1959: the year the PAP came into power. This neglect has
negated the importance of the 1955 election as a lens into contemporary social politics. In the
lead-up to the April 1955 election, mass rallies were held island-wide to raise awareness and
grassroots support for the opposition parties. These were largely aimed at the Chinese
population and focused on rural, as well as urban, areas. Held between January and
March, these rallies would have been watched by the beleaguered inhabitants of recently
devastated ﬂood zones. The mid-1950s political shift can be seen quite clearly in the
composition of candidates in the 1951 and 1955 elections. In 1951, only four Chinese
candidates had run, as compared to 56 in 1955 (Visscher, 2008: 87). The shift also holds
true in the ﬂood areas. At Geylang, the Labour Front candidate Mak Pak Shee won an
overwhelming majority. In Paya Lebar, there was a 50% turnout, with only two candidates:
Lim Koon Teck as an independent and Tan Eng Joo for the Democratic Party (DP). Lim
won by a slim majority.3 It is signiﬁcant that Lim had been very active in post-ﬂood
rehabilitation in the Paya Lebar area since 1953, whilst Tan had kept a low proﬁle (Ong,
1982: reel 32).
Ong Chye Hock, independent candidate in the 1959 Legislative Assembly elections and
active member of various farming and community organisations in the Paya Lebar area
during the 1950s and 1960s, oﬀers a unique perspective on the ﬂoods and the politics of the
mid-1950s. His story, recorded as an oral history of Singapore, oﬀers insight into the
inﬂuence of the ﬂood on the elections. Ong had been at the centre of the 1955 Paya Lebar
election and knew both Lim Koon Teck and Tan Eng Joo well. During the run-up to the
election, Lim had approached Ong when the latter was forming the ﬂood relief committee.
Ong, aware of the potential for raising his community proﬁle, had helped Lim to form the
committee. Ong, Lim, and a few others carried out a door-to-door post-ﬂood campaign to
register household loss and damage. Lim had also approached the Salvation Army for rice
and clothes, especially for the surviving members of the family who had died at Potong Pasir
in December 1954. Both the registration exercise and Lim’s intervention with the Salvation
Army were covered by the press. Ong ﬁrmly believed that Lim’s involvement with the local
community and the broad media coverage were what helped him defeat the DP candidate
Tan Eng Joo. Lim had been active in the area between 1953 and 1955 and had visited the
victim’s families, while Tan had never ‘showed face’ (Ong, 1982: reel 32).4
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Ong’s recollections also reveal more about the fate of the farmers who had been moved
from Paya Lebar to Bedok. It is through his account that we can get a handle on how the
farmers had an established community support network in Paya Lebar, which they lost after
the relocation. This of course directly aﬀected their level of vulnerability and ability to
rebuild after the ﬂoods. Life for the Bedok farmers when they had still been living in
Paya Lebar in 1953 was quite diﬀerent. Ong recalled his experience of the annual
monsoonal ﬂoods in Paya Lebar. In 1953 as well as 1954 they had been quite severe.
He attributed this, not to the rains, but to the new airport development which had caused
debris to block localised drainage systems in Potong Pasir and Tai Seng. In Paya Lebar the
local community had responded by forming a relief committee for the victims. Ong, as a
village head, was a founding member. The committee was ﬁnancially supported by the
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, in addition to the Red Cross and Salvation Army who
contributed with trucks of clothes and rice. He makes no mention of government assistance,
but much of the community’s own self-help mechanisms.
In 1953, Ong suggested that the aid response had been so overwhelming that the farmers
collected a lot of money, new clothes, rice, and livestock. In addition, the local farmers had
savings. Since before the war, Paya Lebar and the surrounding area had been one of
Singapore’s major vegetable farming areas. The farmers had adapted well to the low-lying
swampland, growing crops which ﬂourished in marshy soils and, of course, there was good
irrigation. Yields were good and most of the farmers and their families were well supported
by established community networks and savings. Thus, if disaster struck they had the
resources at hand to rebuild their houses and farms with limited long-term impact.
Moreover, Ong (1982: reel 14) stated that the relief aid in 1953 – garnered through
exaggerated press reports – had so exceeded their need, that the farmers ended up using
the committee oﬃce and its funds for gambling and, to trade and buy gold.
The story that Ong portrays reveals how, in Paya Lebar, the Chinese farming community
was self-supporting with external help derived largely from embedded Chinese organisations,
as opposed to the government. This appeared to have been both a choice and a cultural
norm. The forcible removal of the residents from the more aﬄuent and robust Paya Lebar
had directly contributed to a worsening of their standard of living. It had also distanced
them from their established community support network, making them in turn more reliant
on government and less resilient to disaster.
Conclusions
The ﬂoods of December 1954 can be considered a case study of diﬀerent forms of disaster
justice, as well as a lens into the wider socio-political contexts of the time. Exploring justice
in this instance as intimately connected to social vulnerability and resilience in a disaster, the
situation of the Bedok farmers can be considered an exemplar of disaster (in)justice.
Although the government reacted quickly to the immediate crisis and laid down longer
term strategies for improved ﬂood mitigation schemes, it was the forced resettlement of
the Paya Lebar farming community to an only partially developed site that had arguably
exacerbated the scale and cascading impacts of the disaster. Unable to access the mutuality
of the generations-old community they had known in Paya Lebar, the Bedok residents had
diminished resilience. Their sense of injustice was generated less from the oﬃcial response to
the crisis but from an underlying sense of political powerlessness, and their inability to lay
claim to the same degree of agency they had enjoyed in Paya Lebar post-resettlement.
So, although the government’s immediate disaster response can be viewed as adequate –
even above typical when viewed against the standards of the day – the fact remains that
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it was an essentially paternalistic, top-down approach that did not factor in the issues then
dividing Singaporean society. The framing of the disaster as an Act of God was a linguistic
and legalistic way of avoiding culpability.
Nevertheless, justice, in this instance, is conceptualised as political, that is the agency to
aﬀect change to a situation, then the Bedok inhabitants were not entirely impotent.
Although their demands and complaints did not ultimately lead to the government
accepting culpability for the severity of the ﬂood, nor indeed, did it enable the farmers to
settle elsewhere, their righteous anger was felt at the ballot box in spring 1955. In this sense,
Bedok had become a fundamentally politicised space and the sense of disaster (in)justice
contributed to the growing discourse of anti-colonialism apparent during the 1950s.
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Notes
1. https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/enso/climaterisks/years/top24enso.html; http://ggweather.com/
enso/oni.htm.
2. Daily rainfall data courtesy of Singapore Public Utilities Board for MacRitchie Reservoir.
3. http://www.eld.gov.sg/elections_past_parliamentary1955.html.
4. Politically, the situation was an interesting one. In his retelling of event, Ong stated that the whole
affair was politically very embarrassing for him. Although Ong was working closely with Lim, he
was actually an active member of the DP. In fact, Ong had been asked to be the DP candidate in
1955 but had refused. During the mid-1950s, he was being courted by both Lim and Tan because he
was the de facto Paya Lebar community leader. In the lead-up to the election Ong actually acted as
Tan’s representative (election rules asked for each candidate to have two representatives, Ong was
one, the other was Tan’s uncle). The short DP election campaign was fully funded by the Chinese
Chamber of Commerce but Tans lack of interest meant the campaign was lost. Ong stood in 1959 as
an independent candidate against the DP.
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